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 Material Support: 
Counternarcotics vs. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan 
 
Jonathan D. Kulick, Pepperdine University 
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Carnegie Mellon University 
Mark A.R. Kleiman, University of California, Los Angeles 
Abstract 
Microeconomic analysis of counternarcotics strategies in Afghanistan suggests that 
current policies lend material support to the enemy. Vigorous enforcement can increase the 
flow of funds to insurgents and other parties that profit from trafficking. Rural-development 
programs, promoted as elements of a counternarcotics strategy, are open to some of the 
same objections. The benefits of drug-fighting in Afghanistan for consumer countries in 
Europe and North America are likely to be modest. Anti-corruption efforts in Afghanistan 
and demand-reduction programs both in Afghanistan and in consumer countries, insofar 
as they are feasible, could serve both counternarcotics and counterinsurgency objectives. 
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Introduction 
Afghanistan accounts for some 90 percent of global production of illicit opium, up 
from about 75 percent a decade ago.1, 2 Since the 1970s the country has been wracked by 
conflict. Groups of violent political actors—both insurgent groups and “warlord” organiza-
tions3—derive revenues from the opiates4 trade directly through trafficking or indirectly by 
taxing poppy farmers, extorting protection money from dealers, and providing “security” 
services to dealing organizations. Government officials also profit from graft and as shadow-
state principals in the opiates trade.5 
The superficially obvious prescription, for the United States and its International Se-
curity Assistance Force (ISAF) allies, is to aggressively pursue counternarcotics policies as a 
way of reducing insurgents’ and warlords’ resource bases and also officials’ temptations to 
participate in corruption. And it is true that if the Afghan opiates market disappeared en-
tirely (for example, from an upsurge in lower-cost production elsewhere) the insurgent 
cause would suffer and security and governance in Afghanistan would improve substan-
tially.6, 7 But a complete remission of drug dealing is not a plausible outcome of any feasible 
policy within relevant time horizons, and partial reductions in production tend to be coun-
terproductive from a security-and-governance perspective. 
New U.S. (and U.S.-dominated ISAF) policy partially reflects this analysis, reversing a 
longstanding emphasis on the eradication of poppy crops.8 The reasoning was direct, and 
largely sound: it is not feasible to eradicate enough of the crop to substantially affect export 
volume or heroin use in downstream countries, and destroying farmers’ livelihoods encour-
ages sympathy with the insurgency. Furthermore, reducing production raises the farm gate 
price of opium more than proportionally, thereby increasing the total revenue available to 
opium growers, and thus the potential yield of taxes imposed on them by violent political 
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actors or corrupt officials.9 Ironically, this year’s poppy blight appears to have achieved 
precisely this effect, and done so in the first full year in which the United State was offi-
cially no longer trying to achieve it.10 
The new strategy pursues higher-level traffickers connected to the insurgency, while 
continuing to entice farmers away from poppy growing by offering more attractive licit op-
portunities. But there is reason to doubt that either half of that strategy creates a net 
benefit in terms of security and governance. Both approaches, if they work, increase prices 
and thus total black-market revenues. Intensified enforcement also tends to increase the 
share of total revenues that goes to wielders of force and influence, as opposed to the pro-
duction-oriented activities of growing poppy, refining opium, and exporting opiates. 
Thus expanding efforts against opiate suppliers generally is more likely to increase 
than to reduce traffickers’ revenues and power. In other words, one of the problems recog-
nized with eradication applies equally to all forms of supply control, not just eradication. 
Narcotics traffickers in Afghanistan have a near monopoly on heroin exports, the demand 
for which is highly price-inelastic. And reducing the supply of heroin not only benefits traf-
fickers in general, it disproportionately benefits those who pose the greatest security 
threats. 
Insofar as “alternative livelihood” or “alternative development”11 efforts reduce sup-
plies of, and raise prices for, opium, they—like eradication—have a natural tendency to 
enrich insurgents, warlords, and corrupt officials. Whatever its other merits, rural devel-
opment in Afghanistan should not be sold as counterinsurgency. 
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Nor are the losses on the counterinsurgency side balanced by gains in controlling 
drug abuse. Reducing the supply of opiates from Afghanistan does next to nothing to 
shrink the drug problem in the United States and does little in other ISAF countries. 
Alas, drug-trafficking problems in ill-governed states are intractable to most practi-
cable interventions; the activity is more easily moved around—within the country or to 
another country in the same market—than sharply diminished.12 Policymakers should 
remain skeptical of the capacity of almost any counternarcotics intervention to achieve its 
desired outcomes. It is likely that no policy can satisfy the demand for a “solution” to Af-
ghanistan’s opiates-production problems, and it is not clear that more is, generally, better. 
In such a situation, the primary maxim may not be “Fix the problem” but “Do no harm,” or, 
at least, “Do as little harm as possible.” 
The analytic framework of microeconomics—despite its necessary abstractions from 
some of the complexities of the situation on the ground—can be a useful tool in assessing 
the likely consequences of various counternarcotics strategies on both drug-market out-
comes and security and governance in Afghanistan. How the “drugs-terror system” will 
respond to interventions, or even how it will evolve over time apart from the effect of inter-
ventions, depends strongly on details such as the sizes of inventories at various stages of 
processing (from raw opium to heroin), the decisionmaking processes of Afghan farmers, 
and the capacity and limitations—corruption aside—of Afghan drug enforcement. 
This is a complex and poorly understood system, so all forecasts and estimates of ef-
fects deserve wider-than-normal confidence intervals. That said, while outcomes might be 
different from the ones we project they are unlikely to be so different as to reverse the direc-
tion of our conclusions. Uncertainties about data and the forces at work are as prone to 
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underestimate the damage done to security-and-governance objectives by drug-control 
efforts as to overestimate it. 
Background 
Premises underpinning analysis 
Drug production and distribution are market activities. Participants act out of self-
interest, not ideology, and the system includes many actors whose actions are coordinated 
by price signals.13 In the absence of centralized or monopoly control, microeconomics is the 
essential analytical perspective. 
The Government of Afghanistan has limited capacities to enforce its will. The central 
government has no meaningful control over large sections of the country, including insur-
gent-held areas and nominally loyal areas controlled by warlords. Much of the functional 
local governance is informal, conducted neither by well-defined entities with local sover-
eignty nor by administrative departments accountable to Kabul, but by traditional kin-
group structures. Local, tribal, and ethnic identities compete with the state in defining 
loyalties. Moreover, corruption limits capacity both nationally and locally.14 
Security in Afghanistan is problematic. Throughout much of the country, not coinci-
dentally including poppy-growing areas, personnel of any outside organization—whether 
based abroad or in Kabul—cannot function without either military escort or cooperation 
bought from (corrupt) local power brokers. 
The insurgency is neither monolithic nor highly dependent on the opiates trade for its 
revenues. “The Taliban” encompasses at least three networks of insurgents (even apart from 
the Taliban in Pakistan), and many additional militias ally with the Taliban only because—
and only for so long as—it is expedient. Thus actions against insurgent-traffickers do not 
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merely weaken a monolithic foe, but influence the competitive balance of power within a 
complex array of political entities. Furthermore, there are sources of income besides opiates 
for both the allied militias (e.g., extortion and other general criminal activity on their terri-
tory) and the core insurgent groups (e.g., subventions from sympathizers abroad and 
smuggling of goods other than drugs). 
Heroin production in Afghanistan 
Heroin is produced and distributed through a multilayered network with little direct 
contact or coordination between nonadjacent layers. Farmers grow poppies (in addition to 
other crops—few grow poppies exclusively15). Farmers and hired labor harvest opium latex. 
This is a labor-intensive process, and labor supply can be the limiting factor of produc-
tion.16 The latex is sold at a local bazaar or to traders who visit the farm. The price at the 
bazaar varies by year, region, quality, and point in the growing season,17 but is only slightly 
higher than the farm gate price,18 reflecting a smoothly functioning market without sub-
stantial monopsony power. Lately prices have averaged $130/kg, or almost double what 
they were last year, before the blight. 
Farmers can often make more money growing poppies than other crops, but they 
shift between crops in response not only to perceived profits, but also risks and the ability 
to get their crop to market.19 Perhaps the largest driver of changes in area under cultivation 
is not eradication or enforcement risk, but rather last year’s opium prices as compared to 
current prices of other crops. Low opium prices in 2008 contributed to reduced cultivation 
in 2009. We should anticipate that this year’s higher prices will stimulate expansion of 
cultivation to districts not planted this year. 
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Farm gate opium prices have not quite been bid down to the opportunity cost of the 
labor and land used in its production; there is still some risk of legal sanction, criminal 
violence, or moral premium,20 making poppy cultivation generally more remunerative. How-
ever, farm gate prices should probably be seen as fair-market compensation for the farmers’ 
efforts, not as reflecting a high profit margin. 
Afghan opium and even heroin are agricultural commodities. Opium latex is directly 
a farm product; heroin is a processed farm product, but processing is simple—more like 
brewing beer than making pharmaceuticals. The proportion of value directly attributable to 
farm products is much higher for Afghan heroin than it is for American breakfast cereal.21 
Heroin is produced from opium and precursor chemicals, notably acetic anhydride. 
The proportions are roughly seven kg of opium plus two kg of acetic anhydride to make one 
kg of heroin.22 That kilogram, which contains 7 × $130 = $910 worth of opium, is worth 
roughly $2500 in Afghanistan. That means that conventional farming costs account for 
about 35 percent of the value of the heroin in Afghanistan. The remaining 65 percent is not 
pure profit; it includes compensation for precursors, labor, weapons, bribes, etc. However, 
all that 65 percent essentially motivates or rewards criminals and criminal activity, so long 
as we include corrupt and violent political actors within the definition of criminals. 
The markup from production to final sale is as much as 200-fold (Table 1 shows the 
markup of one kg of heroin, from Afghan farm gate to street-level retail sale in the UK). 
UNODC estimates Afghan opium production at roughly 7000 tons annually.23, 24 If 
that estimate is correct, farm gate revenues are roughly $900 million,25 and total revenues 
of opium-affiliated criminals within Afghanistan (not counting the farmers) are on the order 
of $1.5 billion. Based on the markup to heroin prices in neighboring regions of adjacent 
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countries, another roughly $1.5 billion is generated by smuggling heroin (and some opium 
and morphine) out of Afghanistan, for total criminal revenues from opiate trafficking of 
about $3 billion, or roughly one quarter of Afghan GDP. 
The portion of that $3 billion that goes to the Taliban is subject to considerable de-
bate; estimates run from about $40 million (a little more than one percent of the total) to 
four or five times that amount.26 The factors that limit insurgents’ share of the total are not 
well understood, but clearly the current situation is not nearly the worst possible in terms 
of money available to insurgents. 
Efforts against poppy cultivation in the north have pushed most production into the 
south, where the insurgency is stronger,27 as illustrated in Figure 1. However, southern-
produced opiates still flow northward,28 so at least some of the Taliban’s nominal political 
rivals must be helping to export heroin made from poppies whose production enriches the 
insurgency. They are unlikely to be persuaded to do otherwise in the absence of alternative, 
non-Taliban-linked sources of opiates for export and a reason—perhaps differential en-
forcement effort—to prefer the non-Taliban-linked product. 
Afghanistan dominates the market in the Eastern Hemisphere; Afghan heroin prices 
are one-third to one-fifth those in its nearest competitors. It has little penetration in the 
Western Hemisphere (where consumption is dominated by the United States and produc-
tion by Mexico and Colombia), but more than 90 percent of global consumption of illegal 
opiates is in the Eastern Hemisphere. Afghanistan’s enduring dominance is made clear by 
Figure 2, which shows global opium production since 1995. 
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Why reducing supply increases revenues 
Both enforcement attention and trafficking revenues are divided along two dimen-
sions: “horizontally” among different types of criminals, and “vertically” up and down the 
supply chain. 
A simple analysis shows that reducing the supply of opiates from Afghanistan—by 
whatever means—increases revenues to narcotics traffickers. (A more rigorous analysis of 
how counternarcotics policies affect revenues at different points along the drug-distribution 
chain appears in a later section.) 
The money available to insurgents, warlords, and corrupt officials depends on: 
(1) The volumes of opium and heroin produced, processed, and exported, which in 
turn are the products of total consumption worldwide and Afghanistan’s market share; 
(2) The prices of those commodities; and 
(3) The share of the total revenue that can be extracted as taxes, bribes, or protection 
payments.29 
The volume of heroin consumed depends far less on conditions in producer countries 
than in consumer countries: end-user demand and the presence of illicit distribution net-
works capable of delivering drugs at retail. There is every reason to expect global demand 
for illegal opiates to remain robust for the foreseeable future. 
Since the price of heroin as exported from Afghanistan constitutes only a small frac-
tion of retail prices in consumer countries—a fraction that shrinks with distance—and 
since land suitable for poppy growing is not scarce (less than five percent of Afghanistan’s 
arable land is planted in poppies each year), enforcement targeted at production will only 
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weakly affect end-user prices and therefore only weakly affect volumes consumed.30 The 
insensitivity of final demand to price can be concealed as opium stockpiles buffer market 
fluctuations; the 2000–2001 ban on poppy production spectacularly reduced cultivation 
but did not reduce heroin exports by even a close-to-comparable proportion.31 
Although in theory many countries could produce heroin, in practice once illegal drug 
production becomes established in a particular location it tends to remain there. In a mu-
tually reinforcing feedback loop drug production undermines government control and weak 
government control facilitates drug production.32 Moreover, established trafficking routes 
and relationships—the relational capital that is the central asset for any criminal organiza-
tion—are fixed assets that cannot easily be transferred. Those assets constitute a barrier to 
exit from the industry, further accentuating the markets’ inertia. 
Hence increasing the costs of doing business in Afghanistan to the point where other 
countries (e.g., Pakistan or Burma) became relatively low-cost producers is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition for Afghanistan to lose its dominant position in the opiate-export 
market. Further, the scenarios under which Afghanistan loses its comparative advantage in 
illegal opium production are either wild cards (synthetic opiates undercut the market for 
plant-derived opiates) or are themselves problematic (a competing country such as Pakistan 
becomes a failed state). 
Conversely, even a dramatic fall in Afghan opium prices would not allow it to gain 
substantial market share for the simple reason that it already dominates global markets. 
Price declines might not even greatly expand market share in the (relatively small) Western 
Hemisphere market; Afghanistan already outcompetes Western Hemisphere suppliers on 
price, but has yet to make substantial inroads because Colombia and Mexico are closer to 
market and have established distribution networks. Thus both the size of the world opiate 
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markets and the Afghan share of those markets can probably be treated as largely invariant 
to policy interventions over the next five years, if not longer, absent radical changes in se-
curity and governance in Afghanistan or potential competing export countries. 
Agricultural commodities are subject to a classic paradox: bad harvests are good for 
landowning farmers, except for those whose crops are unusually hard hit. When yields are 
high, landowners collectively suffer because prices decline. Landowners collectively benefit 
when poor harvests or restrictive policies drive up prices, at least when there are no close 
substitutes. If a blight affected only one variety of apple, blight-affected growers would not 
benefit; consumers would just substitute other varieties. Likewise, if the blight affected all 
apples but in only half the apple-growing region, blight-affected growers would likely be 
worse off. But a blight that reduced the harvest uniformly would benefit all growers. At 
least in the short run, there are few substitutes for Afghan opium—except for stockpiled 
Afghan opium from previous harvests. 
Efforts to suppress opium production act like a blight; they are therefore likely to in-
crease Afghan drug-market revenues. This applies to reducing poppy production via rural-
development efforts or attempting to buy the opium crop as well as to eradication; anything 
that reduces the supply of opium increases its price, and, since retail demand is very ine-
lastic to prices near the source, increases revenue as well.33 Seizing opium or heroin in 
Afghanistan has the same general effect, and seizures in downstream markets are even 
worse; they suppress consumption only marginally while—from Afghanistan’s perspective—
they increase quantities shipped to make up for those seizures. 
 12 
Division of trafficking revenues among insurgents, warlords, and corrupt officials 
Policies also influence the “horizontal” division of revenues among rival market par-
ticipants. More intensive enforcement is likely to do so in a perverse way from a 
counterinsurgency perspective. 
Insurgents 
There are at least two reasons to fear that increasing drug control will increase not 
only the total criminal revenues from trafficking, but also the share that goes to insurgents.  
The division of trafficking profits among trafficking groups and those who provide 
services or collect extortion payments is determined by a very complicated political-
economic balancing. Stirring the pot can have effects that are hard to predict. Since, cur-
rently, insurgents capture only a small share of the roughly $3 billion in potential 
trafficking-related revenues, redistributing revenue shares could make things much worse. 
Highly strategic market interventions might reduce insurgents’ share of the pie still further. 
However, drug markets often respond to interventions in unexpected ways. Thus some 
humility may be appropriate when contemplating strategies for reengineering drug markets. 
Moreover, tougher drug control generally is more likely to shift market share toward 
rather than away from insurgents.34 Opiate trafficking in Afghanistan is not centralized; it 
involves many competing organizations, farmers and growing areas, and export routes. In 
addition to extracting taxes on poppy growing and other drug-market activities in areas 
they control, insurgent groups can become more directly involved in the traffic by selling 
protection to traffickers and deploying their capacity for intimidation and corruption to 
shelter traffickers’ activities from enforcement. The value of those protection services in-
creases with the level of enforcement activity.35 
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Increased enforcement is necessarily concentrated in areas under government con-
trol; the success of the campaign against poppy growing in most of Afghanistan has 
concentrated production in insurgent-held areas. 
Thus more enforcement tends to produce higher total revenues, an increased share of 
the illicit take for purveyors of protection, and a diminished share of activity in areas under 
government control. All three effects tend to increase financial flows to insurgents, so the 
natural tendency of drug-suppression activity is to aid the insurgency rather than to sup-
press it. That might not be true if suppression efforts could be focused on the part of the 
trade linked to or taxed by the insurgents, but the natural tendency of efforts by the Afghan 
government and its allies is to concentrate in areas controlled by the government. Even 
there, prudent local officials may find it inadvisable from a personal-safety perspective to 
pay too much attention to dealers with armed allies. 
Parallel analysis can be adapted to cover two other contributions of the opiates trade 
to security-and-governance problems: the support it provides to warlords not affiliated with 
the insurgency and the temptations it creates for corruption within Afghan government 
agencies. 
Warlords 
Some of these warlord enterprises, especially along the northern borders, are more 
actively involved in the opiates traffic than are the insurgent groups. They are engaged as 
principals actually buying, transporting, and selling drugs, not merely as taxing authorities 
or purveyors of protection services. Their revenues depend on prices, volumes, their market 
share, and the share of the value added within the supply chain that they can capture for 
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themselves. If enforcement drives up prices while leaving volumes largely unchanged, its 
tendency is to benefit warlords as well as insurgents.36 
Moreover, insofar as the warlords have a competitive advantage over “pure” drug traf-
fickers without armed backing or political cloutbeing better able to deploy violence and 
corrupt influence in defense of their activities—increased enforcement tends to increase the 
relative value of that advantage. For example, increased border security is more likely to be 
a problem for small-scale smugglers than it is for the smuggling enterprise affiliated with a 
warlord army or a former (or current) army or police commander’s gang. Small-scale opera-
tors who are not entirely deterred by increased enforcement have three choices: they can 
accept increased arrests and seizures as a cost of doing business, they can change their 
operations in more or less expensive and inconvenient ways to evade enforcement, or they 
can offer bribes to officials and other power brokers. Warlords, with their private armies, 
have a fourth option: they can use violence or the threat of violence to intimidate enforce-
ment agencies. (This can be combined with bribery, especially where traffickers have 
political as well as military muscle.) If increased enforcement raises costs for warlords and 
the traffickers they protect less than it raises costs for competing trafficking organizations, 
the result will be larger profits and greater market share for the warlords. 
Corrupt officials 
Corruption creates many problems. Some are direct; corrupt officials may be less dil-
igent than honest officials would be. Some are systemic; the money from corruption can 
flow up the chain from officials to those who appoint them, thus in effect closing the path to 
public service to those unwilling to channel cash to their superiors. Others abet the insur-
gency directly; the reputation for corruption saps public support for the government, 
especially when competing power centers are believed to be less self-serving. 
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Anticorruption enforcement has only a limited capacity to reduce the size of the prob-
lem so long as corruption is supported by the broader political culture and individual 
officials have discretion to confer great benefits or impose great costs on private-sector ac-
tors. But it may be worth expanding that effort anyway, because corruption arrests can 
indicate the government's non-acquiescence in corrupt practices, with possible benefits in 
its level of public support.37 The higher into the government corrupt influence reaches, the 
harder it will be to mount credible anticorruption efforts aimed at lower-level officials. The 
2010 trial of a police general for facilitating the drug trade across the Iran and Turkmeni-
stan borders is a promising development in this regard.38 
While anticorruption efforts can help counternarcotics-enforcement efforts, the con-
verse is less likely to be the case. The greater the enforcement pressure, the greater the 
benefits enforcement officials can confer on traffickers by turning a blind eye to their activi-
ties and by interfering with the activities of their competitors.39 (Again, as with traffickers’ 
profits, this is true under the conditions that we believe obtain in Afghanistan; if enforce-
ment were perfect, then there would be no opportunity for corruption.) If enforcement is to 
be stepped up, the need for better-trained, better-disciplined, and better-paid counternar-
cotics police becomes all the greater. Even honest drug-law enforcement relies heavily on 
information from some participants in the illicit traffic to make cases against other partici-
pants, and traffickers can exploit this by informing on one another to achieve competitive 
advantage. This makes it all the more difficult for officials running anticorruption efforts to 
distinguish honest from corrupt enforcement activity. 
The value to traffickers of corrupting enforcement agents—an activity described as 
currently inseparable from most drug trafficking in Afghanistan—can be reduced in at least 
two distinct ways. Simply cutting back on the level of enforcement effort will tend not only 
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to reduce the total monetary value of the drug traffic but also to reduce the share of total 
revenues that corrupt enforcement agents can extract. The alternative approach is to mul-
tiply the number of agencies whose officials have investigative and arrest powers over any 
given trafficker, thus reducing the capacity of any one agent or agency to provide a “license” 
to traffic. That strategy is contrary to the usual recommendation to create a single elite 
drug enforcement unit, but efficiently providing corrupt enforcement may be worse than 
inefficiently providing more nearly honest enforcement.40 
Effects of rural-development programs 
Economic development is central to any strategy to strengthen the government 
against insurgents, criminals, and other armed unofficial actors. Indeed, there are many 
rationales for promoting economic development in Afghanistan, including via programs 
targeting opium farmers. However, asking those programs to shrink drug-trafficking profits 
merely sets them up for failure. 
That improving economic opportunities for farmers in drug-producing countries 
should not be viewed as a drug-control program or judged by its success in those terms is a 
commonplace in the development community. But many in the drug-control community 
view rural development as a drug-control strategy, alongside interdiction, treatment, and 
other interventions. Furthermore, some hold unrealistic hopes for the ability of rural devel-
opment to advance counterinsurgency by affecting drug markets (beyond shifting the 
location of production). This section challenges those beliefs. 
Rural development is not a counternarcotics program 
Offering carrots is intuitively appealing and often more feasible politically than wield-
ing sticks, and rural-development programs have been implemented in a host of drug-
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producing countries, sometimes actually reducing local production. However, there is not a 
single documented instance in which crop substitution has had any meaningful impact on 
U.S. drug use, or even on reducing drug production in a large region.41 This is not for lack 
of trying, as U.S. experience with coca growers in South America has demonstrated. Some 
counter that the problem is with crop substitution and that more sophisticated forms of 
alternative development are needed. However, the problem is fundamental to all  interven-
tions that try to woo farmers away from growing the crops from which expensive illegal 
drugs are made. 
If some growers are convinced to switch, others will take up their slack. Folklore 
holds that peasant farmers grow illegal drug crops only out of dire necessity; if they could 
earn even subsistence wages they would gladly opt out of the illegal economy. In fact, for a 
sufficiently large minority of growers as to determine the outcome, poppy is simply a crop to 
be grown along with others when it is in their interest to do so.42 The marginal utility of 
income declines sharply for middle-class residents in wealthy countries; yet wherever the 
knee is in that curve, Afghanistan is so poor that its farmers need not wonder whether or 
not the next Afghani will improve their welfare. 
Even if rural-development programs could hugely increase the returns from legal 
crops, drug traffickers can easily raise the prices they pay to compete. Farmers’ earnings 
account for less than one percent of the retail price of heroin in rich countries, and less 
than ten percent of the retail price even in Afghanistan’s poor neighbors. Therefore, even if 
rural development works as intended, its principal effect will be to raise farmers’ earnings, 
not to reduce illegal-crop cultivation. 
There will always be farmers somewhere in the world willing to grow an illicit crop, 
even if economic development in one country makes that country’s farmers no longer the 
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low-cost producers. So the usual conclusion is that rural development might help a given 
source country even if it does not disturb global production. Indeed, in the long run, that is 
a reasonable way to think about rural development even for Afghanistan. If in 30 years 
Afghanistan is a stable middle-income country, its poppy growing might all have shifted to 
other, poorer countries. However, Afghanistan is by far the lowest-cost producer at present, 
so the total volume of opiates produced in Afghanistan will depend almost entirely on the 
demand in importing countries. (Inventories can buffer year-to-year changes, but eventu-
ally whatever is sold must be produced, and whatever is produced and not seized will 
eventually be sold, since neither opium nor heroin is perishable.) 
So in the short or even medium run, when rural development or other factors elimi-
nate Afghan production in some districts, the displacement is likely to be to somewhere else 
in Afghanistan, not to another country. Furthermore, given how little of the world market is 
supplied by other countries, it would take unprecedented growth in both absolute and per-
centage terms for other countries to replace any substantial share of Afghan production 
within the next five years. 
Rural development in poppy-growing areas is not a counterinsurgency program 
If the only objective of a rural-development program were to reduce the drug supply 
in destination countries, it could be thought of as a benign failure. Indeed, to the extent 
that rural-development efforts funded by counternarcotics ambitions are really just eco-
nomic development masquerading as counternarcotics, some might view it as a clever way 
to fund what they see as “good” interventions (development aid) from “dark” (counternarcot-
ics) budgets. 
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However, in Afghanistan, the downside is potentially much worse. The Taliban do not 
single out the opium trade for taxes or protection payments because of Koranic proscrip-
tions; they collect money from anyone who has it and who is not in a position to say no. So 
do other powerful actors—criminals, warlords, and corrupt officials. Inasmuch as all eco-
nomic activity is potentially subject to taxation or extortion, development programs can 
create revenue streams for local power brokers. Even transporting agricultural aid into a 
region creates opportunities to demand payments to ensure safe passage. Furthermore, 
rural-development efforts driven by a counternarcotics agenda that are channeled toward 
poppy-growing areas are de facto being channeled toward provinces where the insurgency 
is relatively stronger and government control relatively weaker, since that is where the pop-
pies are now grown This uncomfortable conclusion should at least lead decisionmakers to 
require a higher-than-usual degree of confidence that a given rural-development program is 
effective before putting it into effect, but it may justify a fundamental reevaluation of where 
in the country alternative development should be pursued. 
A simple calculation suggests that this could be a first-order concern. Some claim 
that the Taliban assess a 10–20 percent tax in the areas they control.43 If donors were to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars annually on rural-development programs in vulner-
able areas, the increase in extortion revenues would rival some estimates of what the Tali-
ban earn from the opiates trade.44 Even if less development effort goes on in Taliban-held 
territory the Taliban can still extract a share of the supplies that must pass through their 
territory on the way to projects in government-held areas.45 
This suggests targeting rural-development assistance where extortion taxes are rela-
tively low and are collected by less-objectionable parties. (Common criminals are 
presumably less objectionable than insurgents; the relative status of corrupt officials is 
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another question.) For the part of alternative development that masquerades as counter-
narcotics, that means rural-development programs could be given as a reward to provinces 
that have rid themselves of poppies, rather than focusing on the areas that now grow the 
most poppies, since the provinces that continue to grow poppies are precisely those where 
the insurgents are strongest (see Figure 1). 
Given the damage that poppy growing does to security and governance, preventing 
the introduction or reintroduction of poppy growing in areas that are nearly poppy free is a 
worthwhile objective. The threat of eradication—backed by only occasional actual eradica-
tion—might be enough to keep farmers in areas that are now poppy free from returning to 
poppy growing. Eradication in areas with widespread growing adversely affects many farm-
ers; eradication in areas that are largely poppy free directly affects only the few who deviate 
from local norms and can achieve a high probability of a given plot being eradicated with 
relatively modest total amounts of eradication 
On the other hand, concentrating poppy growing in insurgent-dominated areas gives 
farmers taxed by the Taliban a virtual monopoly in the opium trade, increasing the reve-
nues available to the Taliban. A pure realpolitik strategy would sacrifice a portion of the 
relatively stable poppy-free areas to become poppy-producing competitors to the Taliban-
controlled lands, while still keeping most of the non-Taliban areas poppy free. But justifying 
that in front of news cameras may be one of the few tasks that makes eliminating the drug 
trade look easy. 
The more practical but still dramatic steps would be (1) stop pretending that “rural 
livelihoods” is a drug-policy initiative and (2) pay attention to how alternative development 
affects the income not only of poor farmers but also of the insurgents who tax them. 
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Effects of drug enforcement on Afghan drug revenues along the distribution chain 
This section provides a more detailed analysis of why constraining Afghan opiate pro-
duction will increase—not reduce—total revenues of the Afghan drug trade. It can be 
skipped without loss of continuity by those who already grasp the economic logic. 
The key parameter in this analysis is the price-elasticity of demand—the percentage 
change in consumption resulting from a one-percent increase in price. As with most goods, 
drug consumption responds to price; when the retail price goes up, consumption goes 
down, somewhat in the short run, more in the longer run.46 Estimates in the literature 
vary, and the true value probably varies according to the relationship between prices and 
incomes: the more of a consumer’s income a drug accounts for, the more he has to cut 
back if the price goes up. But a reasonable guess at the average retail price elasticity is 
−0.75: that is, a 10-percent increase in retail price would lead to a 7.5-percent decrease in 
consumption. (An elasticity of −1.0, “unit elasticity,” means that consumption decreases 
proportionally to an increase in retail price, leaving revenue constant. An elasticity of −0.75, 
reflecting less sensitivity of consumption to price, is in the range called “relatively inelastic,” 
where a retail price increase leads to a revenue increase.) 
On its path from the farm to a foreign consumer, a bit of opium (later, heroin) might 
be bought and sold several times within Afghanistan, several times in transit countries, and 
as many as five times within the final-market country. Each transaction occurs at a lower 
level of the market and at a higher unit price. The effect of drug enforcement in Afghanistan 
on production, consumption, and profits overall and by market level depends on three fac-
tors: 
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(1) The retail price-elasticity of demand, and how retail elasticity in different submar-
kets is aggregated and reflected up the distribution chain toward the source. The resulting 
elasticity of demand with respect to the Afghan export price is low. So enforcement that 
drives up Afghan export prices suppresses consumption only modestly and thus increases 
total revenues of the Afghan opiates sector. 
(2) How parallel producers/suppliers compete for market share and how enforcement 
affects the outcome of that competition. Enforcement has some limited ability to shift mar-
ket share from one set of traffickers to another by creating risk differentials. 
(3) How enforcement at one level of a distribution chain affects prices, volumes, and 
net revenues both further up the chain (i.e., towards the farmer) and further down the 
chain (i.e., towards the consumer).47 Armed political actors benefit from seizures down-
stream of the market levels from which they derive profits, because traffickers must pay to 
replace the lost drugs; a kilogram of heroin seized contributes just as much to the demand 
for opium as a kilogram of heroin consumed. 
Price-elasticity, and how it is reflected up the distribution chain 
When aggregating across different markets supplied by one overall distribution chain, 
the overall elasticity of demand is the weighted sum of the elasticity in each submarket, 
weighting by the volume demanded in each submarket.48 Most of the opiates exported from 
Afghanistan are consumed in Asia.49 
When the export price increases, consumption in downstream markets is not affected 
by the same proportion in every market. Some downstream markets will see a larger pro-
portional change in consumption, acting as “shock absorbers,” partially insulating other 
downstream markets from the effects of those price changes.50 In effect, customers who are 
 23 
richer (and therefore less responsive to price changes) can “bid away” supplies from poorer 
customers. 
Every market level has its own demand and supply curves, which are all closely re-
lated. The demand at one level is said to be “derived” from demand at the next higher level. 
Likewise, prices differ across market levels but are related inasmuch as the price at one 
level is the cost of goods at the next lower level. However, the slopes of the demand curves 
differ across market levels. Demand at higher market levels is relatively less responsive to 
price changes at those market levels than is the corresponding demand at lower market 
levels to price changes at those market levels, because it is the retail consumer who even-
tually determines total volume, and the retail price depends only weakly on prices further 
up the chain. 
Opiate prices increase enormously down the distribution chain—more than fifty-fold 
between export from Afghanistan and retail in wealthy countries (where the elasticity of 
retail heroin demand has been measured most). Therefore a large proportional increase in 
the Afghan export price will yield much smaller proportional increases in retail prices. So a 
given change in volume consumed is associated with a small percentage change in retail 
price and a larger percentage change in export price. Price responsiveness (elasticity) is 
therefore much smaller at the Afghan export level than at the retail level.51 
For example, if the elasticity of retail demand for heroin in Europe and Asia, with re-
spect to the retail price of heroin there, were −0.75, and a doubling in the price of heroin 
exported from Afghanistan led to a ten-percent increase in retail prices, then the elasticity 
of demand for exported heroin would be on the order of −0.075: an order of magnitude 
smaller, in absolute value. As a result, demand for Afghan opiate exports is, almost cer-
tainly, relatively inelastic. Even if retail elasticity were somewhat more than unit elastic, by 
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the time that demand is reflected up to the Afghan export level the demand at the export 
level would almost certainly be relatively inelastic. 
Since the farm gate price of opium constitutes a much larger share of the Afghan re-
tail price of heroin, and even more of the retail price of opium, than it does of the European 
retail price, Afghan consumption will respond much more to changes in opium prices than 
will consumption in Europe, with the rest of Asia somewhere between the two. This conclu-
sion seems consistent with existing data on the temporary price increases resulting from 
the 2001 Taliban opium ban.52 
So, inasmuch as Afghanistan is almost a monopoly supplier of opiates to Europe and 
much of Asia, at least in the medium term, enforcement that limits Afghan supply will in-
crease revenues to the Afghan opiates sector.53 
How drug suppliers divide up market share 
Drug markets adapt. When enforcement eliminates a dealer or dealing tactic, or 
shrinks the volume that dealer or tactic can handle, the market expands somewhere else—
a “balloon effect.” Some advocate “market jiu-jitsu,” pushing down hardest on the most 
noxious elements, knowing that the suppressed trafficking will be displaced, rather than 
eliminated. If trafficking is displaced to less noxious forms, the total damage may be re-
duced even if the volumes change little.54 
This idea could work in Afghanistan by, for example, trying to push trafficking and 
associated revenues away from the Taliban to other, less ideological militias. Likewise, ac-
tions in Afghanistan might affect whether heroin destined for western Europe flows north 
through Central Asia and Russia, south through Pakistan, or southwest through Iran and 
Turkey.55 However, the enforcement-risk differentials needed to induce such a reallocation 
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of market share may be greater for large-scale traffickers in Afghanistan than for retail 
sellers in the United States and Europe. 
The prevailing “risks and prices” theory says that drug markets are markets, with fac-
tors of production entering and exiting in response to price signals to equate returns 
available from other employment.56, 57 This model improves on non-market models, but it is 
an idealization, particularly at market levels where the market is embedded within, and its 
operations modified by, social networks. Thus “risks and prices” is a better model of retail 
markets and of poppy cultivation than of high-level distribution, for (at least) three reasons. 
First, insolvency does not weed out inefficient drug distributors, because essentially all 
dealers enjoy positive accounting profits, even if some have negative economic profits.58 
Second, information flows are highly imperfect in social-network-based markets, so the law 
of one price breaks down; arbitrage can bid away only gross price discrepancies. Substan-
tial (±30 percent) price dispersion can persist indefinitely in drug markets.59 Third, actual 
humans do not respond to risk differentials precisely as conventional economic reasoning 
dictates.60 
Moreover, the proper model of risk of arrest from trafficking is not a simple “coin-
tossing” process, where each dealing cycle has a fixed probability of an arrest. Instead, it is 
more like a two-stage process. Imagine that the first time a trafficker attempts a particular 
modus operandi, he tosses a (weighted) coin: heads means the technique is basically sound 
and tails means it is isn’t; so tails means the game is over before it starts. A trafficker who 
gets a heads on that first toss then tosses a second, different coin once for each shipment 
or transaction: heads means things went normally and the deal succeeded, while tails 
means, through the vagaries of crime, the trafficker got caught. Since the probability of 
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tails with the second coin is much lower than with the first coin, once traffickers stumble 
upon a viable m.o. they tend to stick with it. 
Market share, therefore, does not reallocate quickly in response to modest differences 
in enforcement pressure or profitability among high-level traffickers. If the economic benefit 
of legal crops exceeds that of poppies, farmers react quickly (the next growing season), just 
as retail sellers respond quickly to an enforcement crackdown. However, this same logic 
may not apply to higher-level trafficking. It takes a large profit differential (and, by implica-
tion, a large differential in enforcement pressure) to induce a high-level trafficker to 
experiment with a new technique (e.g., route or supplier) because, even if the probability of 
tails on the second coin increases or the profits per completed transaction on heads falls, it 
would be even riskier to toss the first coin for a new technique. Since an established traf-
ficker faces lower costs than a new trafficker or one entering a new market—with that 
dangerous first-toss risk—the incumbent is likely to be earning some pure profit, and so 
can absorb a cost increase while remaining profitable. 
For example, traffickers in the Afghanistan-to-Europe distribution pipelines will be 
reluctant to begin flying to Bangkok and looking for Burmese heroin, even if they must 
start paying 20 or 35 percent more for Afghan heroin. They would rather stick with their 
m.o. and pass along the higher costs, leading to (slightly) lower consumption, and be con-
tent with a slightly diminished market, or, alternatively, absorb the costs, accepting some 
reduction in profit. 
Likewise, suppose targeted enforcement increased costs on the Afghanistan-Iran-
Turkey-Europe pipeline, effectively doubling that export price from $2500 per kg to $5000, 
but did not increase costs on the Afghanistan-Tajikistan-Russia-Europe pipeline. Pure 
risks-and-prices analysis would predict a shift in market share to the Russian route, until 
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limited factors of production raised the marginal cost on that route to equilibrate the total 
cost on the two pipelines converging on the same European market, where a law of one 
price held. Realistically, however, distributors along the southern pipeline, where the price 
rose from $2500 per kg to the European wholesale price (perhaps $50k), would just live 
with a reduction in their aggregate mark-ups from $47.5k per kg to $45k. 
Thus there is enough slack in operating margins for distribution chains to absorb 
even large percentage changes in the different routes’ export prices. Similar but less ex-
treme versions of this principle apply within Afghanistan; shifting who owns (and profits 
from) the bazaar-to-export links in the distribution chain requires that the enforcement-
risk differential create more than an incremental change—large enough to shake people out 
of their known and trusted m.o. 
This market inertia makes the “push-down, pop-up” model of displacing trafficking 
more difficult to implement with large-volume traffickers in Afghanistan. Or, it may work 
only if the enforcement activity is so intense as to actually dismantle the target organiza-
tions rather than merely seizing easily replaced product and arresting easily replaced 
employees. Reconstituting a shattered organization is a much greater challenge. 
How enforcement at one market level affects upstream and downstream levels 
The drug-distribution business is not entirely vertically integrated. Within Afghani-
stan, there are at least four levels, characterized by sales from one level to the next rather 
than employer-employee relationships: (1) farmers, (2) opium-bazaar merchants, (3) aggre-
gators and refiners, and (4) smugglers. 
Opiates seizures in Afghanistan have different effects on insurgent profits depending 
on whether those profits come primarily from upstream (farmers and bazaars) or down-
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stream (smugglers). Inasmuch as the goal is to affect insurgents’ profits and power, it is 
useful to hit upstream (between the insurgents’ level of operations and the farm gate), and 
counterproductive to hit downstream (between the insurgents and consumers). For exam-
ple, if insurgents made most of their profits from smuggling drugs, then seizures within 
Afghanistan would reduce those profits, whereas seizures outside—including in final-
market countries—would increase them. However, if (as seems less likely61) insurgents’ 
profits came primarily from taxing farmers, then heroin seizures anywhere would increase 
insurgents’ revenues, but other forms of enforcement (e.g., seizing traffickers’ money) would 
reduce those revenues. 
The details depend on the elasticities of demand and supply at different points, but 
downstream seizures behave almost like an increase in demand by users: they enrich up-
stream suppliers. Downstream non-seizure enforcement is a modest win; it increases the 
retail price, which slightly reduces demand, which slightly reduces upstream demand and 
profits.62 Enforcement upstream, both seizures and other cost-generating actions, has a 
modest adverse effect on downstream suppliers, by increasing their costs. Thus, if the sole 
consideration were reducing insurgents’ profits from drug trafficking, enforcement down-
stream of the Taliban should avoid seizing drugs. 
Effects on drug consumption, dependency, and harms to drug users 
Easing up on crop eradication and other types of enforcement, or reducing rural-
development efforts, may risk an increase in drug supply that lowers prices and thereby 
exacerbates problems of drug abuse. The effects will vary geographically. Richer countries 
and those farther from Afghanistan will feel the least impact: the United States hardly at 
all, western Europe slightly more, eastern Europe somewhat more, Afghanistan’s neighbors 
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perhaps significantly, and Afghanistan itself most of all. This section explains why there are 
such sharp differences. 
Impact on the United States 
For three reasons, we expect counternarcotics interventions in Afghanistan to have 
essentially no effect on drug use in the United States. 
First, heroin used in the United States primarily comes from the Western Hemisphere 
(notably Mexico and Colombia63), and Afghanistan has not been well positioned to compete 
in the U.S. market. 
Second, inventories of Afghan opiates are sufficient to keep markets supplied during 
any production interruption. Global opium demand has never exceeded 5,000 tons per 
year, yet illicit stockpiles may be approaching 10,000 tons.64 So reductions in production 
might only slow the rate of accumulation of excess inventory, and even near-total elimina-
tions of production that lasted only a year or two might not have appreciable effects on 
consumers. Indeed, to some extent that is what was observed during the 2001 Taliban 
poppy ban, at least in Europe.65 
Third, users in developed countries with high retail prices account for a small share 
of global consumption, and they are likely to be the least affected by changes in production 
volumes. Afghanistan is the primary supplier of heroin to Europe, but fewer than ten per-
cent of Eastern Hemisphere opiate users are in Europe (excluding Russia).66 So Asian 
markets serve as shock absorbers for the European markets. 
Hence counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan have no realistic prospect of ame-
liorating drug problems in the United States, and reducing such efforts has little risk of 
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exacerbating the U.S. heroin problem. Counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan should not 
be thought of as drug-control programs, from the perspective of controlling U.S. drug use. 
The isolation of the U.S. market from Afghan heroin is not inevitable; in the not-so-
distant past a substantial share of U.S. heroin supplies came from Southwest or Southeast 
Asian sources.67 Even today, Asian sources supply an important share of the Canadian 
market and, thereby, at least partly supply some northern U.S. cities. 
There are two conceivable mechanisms by which Afghanistan could contribute to the 
U.S. drug-abuse problem. First, the Afghan heroin price is roughly one percent of the U.S. 
price. Americans operating in a country where heroin prices are so extraordinarily low face 
an increased risk of using and becoming dependent, even more so if they are placed under 
enormous psychological stress. 
Second, Americans or their allies in Afghanistan (either in uniform or as contractors) 
could become involved in trafficking back to the United States. 
Cheap heroin has been readily available far from U.S. shores for decades and will re-
main so. U.S. consumers have been protected from a flood of cheap heroin not by shortages 
in global production but by the absence of direct smuggling routes from source countries.68 
So long as Americans and U.S. organizations operate in Afghanistan there will be logistical 
connections between cheap Afghan heroin and U.S. markets. An entire year’s worth of U.S. 
heroin consumption would fit in a single shipping container. 
These problems are, for now, speculative, but the Vietnam experience shows that 
they are not unthinkable—indeed, British troops currently are being investigated for drug 
smuggling.69 However, the risks both of habituation of U.S. personnel and of the developing 
of smuggling routes are not likely to be substantially mediated by price; halving, or dou-
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bling, the price of heroin in Afghanistan would have little effect on the revenue potential 
from successful smuggling, and the price is already too low to constitute much of a barrier 
to user-level experimentation. 
Impact on Europe and Asia 
Reductions, or increases, in Afghan opiates production will also have minimal imme-
diate effects on heroin use in the Eastern Hemisphere, because of excess production and 
inventories, but sustained reductions would have greater effects.  
Asian countries consume the majority of Afghan opiates, notably Iran, India, China, 
and Pakistan, with Afghanistan itself perhaps rising into those ranks. (Both Asian and Eu-
ropean areas of Russia are also substantial consumers.) Hence unless reductions in 
production or exports were extremely severe, there would still be enough heroin to supply 
relatively high-priced Western European markets.70 
Data are weak, but reductions in Afghan exports should most affect consumption in 
the lowest-price markets, which tend to be closest to Afghanistan. Eastern Europe (includ-
ing European Russia) has intermediate prices and so may be in an intermediate situation. 
Hence to the extent that counternarcotics operations reduce Afghan exports, Iran and Paki-
stan would benefit most. Conversely, they are at the greatest risk should reduced efforts in 
Afghanistan lead to increased production and decreased prices; indeed, Russia and Iran 
have complained vociferously about the suspension of poppy eradication.71 
Impact on Afghanistan 
On the order of 0.5–1.5 million Afghans are dependent on heroin or opium.72 The 
mid-range figure of one million is triple, in per capita terms, the rate of addiction to all 
“hard” drugs (i.e., other than cannabis) combined in the United States. 
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Tightening supply via stricter enforcement would be expected to drive up prices and 
reduce use in Afghanistan, while loosening up would have the opposite effects. However, for 
three reasons, any impact on Afghan consumption may be hard to detect. 
First, even in relatively wealthy countries with efficient government institutions it is 
hard for drug-enforcement programs to substantially reduce drug use. 
Second, drug use often follows an epidemic cycle,73 and Afghan use appears to be in 
the rapid-escalation stage. In many countries, expansion during that stage has over-
whelmed control efforts. Hence even determined efforts in Afghanistan over the next few 
years might only reduce the rate of increase in addiction, rather than reduce its magnitude. 
Third, inasmuch as Afghanistan has not much more than five percent of the world’s 
opiate users, and inventories held there could be one or two years of global consumption, it 
is hard to imagine an across-the-board tightening of supply in Afghanistan unless it be-
came riskier for traffickers to hold that inventory in Afghanistan than further down the 
international distribution network. 
Hence it seems plausible that the greater contributor to market availability and price 
experienced by Afghan users is the strength or weakness of local enforcement operations, 
and simply whether the users are or are not in regions where drug traffickers operate with 
relative impunity. It is easier to imagine eliminating production in one Afghan province 
having an effect on availability in that province than to imagine reductions in total Afghan 
production affecting availability throughout Afghanistan. 
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Demand and harm reduction 
Demand reduction in importing nations 
Anything that reduces demand for opiates in the Eastern Hemisphere reduces the 
profitability of growing poppies and making heroin, in Afghanistan or anywhere else in Asia. 
So consumer countries currently complaining about the suspension of eradication efforts in 
Afghanistan can reasonably be asked if they are doing all they can do to reduce heroin 
consumption within their borders. In most, the answer is clearly “no,” even within existing 
economic and organizational constraints. 
Opiate addiction is the most treatable substance-abuse disorder because of the exis-
tence of substitute drugs with proven records of attracting patients and reducing (though 
often not eliminating) their illicit-market purchases.74 Because substitutes are also psy-
choactive and habituating, they remain politically controversial, despite their clearly 
established efficacy in improving the health and social functioning of opiate abusers and 
reducing their rates of economic crime. In much of Western Europe and Iran, concern 
about HIV has overcome governmental resistance to substitution therapies, but Russia, 
despite major heroin and HIV problems, remains resistant. Nothing that happens in Af-
ghanistan, for good or ill, would affect the Russian drug problem nearly as much as would 
the adoption of substitution therapies, and that step would also help Afghanistan, by 
shrinking the market for Afghan heroin. 
Domestic drug-law enforcement can also help control heroin consumption, though 
typically at a high cost in enforcement resources and incarceration. Insofar as it is possible 
to increase not just the price of the drug, but also the difficulty users face in finding sellers, 
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domestic drug enforcement reduces import demand (although seizures tend to have the 
opposite effect). 
The United States, where a large proportion of heroin users are in the criminal-
justice system, has begun to experiment with frequent drug tests and quick sanctions in 
the form of short jail stays for continued drug use.75 Whether such a system can reduce 
overall heroin demand in any given country depends both on the proportion of its users 
under criminal-justice supervision and on the capacity of the supervising agencies to carry 
out the testing-and-sanctions regime, which requires substantial interagency coordination. 
So there are policy changes that would help. Still, since drug-control measures tend 
to change slowly and we are contemplating changes to be made by third countries, other 
than either the U.S. or Afghanistan, it would be imprudent to rely on controls in those im-
porting countries to provide much relief to Afghan authorities struggling to control the 
export market. 
Interventions with users in Afghanistan 
Afghanistan itself could pursue demand-side approaches to limiting the impact of 
drug abuse. The prospects for major improvement are not bright, but there could be some 
beneficial effects and fewer risks of unintended adverse consequences than with supply-
side interventions. 
Demand-control interventions not only reduce drug use, they also tend to reduce 
prices. So if Afghans consume between five and ten percent of Afghan opiate production,76 
shrinking that demand would probably reduce revenues of the Afghan opium industry more 
than proportionally. 
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The cost of substitutes (higher than the cost of heroin in Afghanistan), added to the 
lack of infrastructure and likely cultural resistance might mean that large-scale opiate-
substitution therapy may not be a practical option for Afghanistan. Although they are not 
nearly as effective, other drug-treatment modalities (colloquially, “talk therapies”) do not 
employ opiate substitutes. Conceivably, funding these treatments would offer a double 
benefit of improved services for current users and better job prospects for some who might 
otherwise be unemployed. 
Even if funding treatment will not make a material difference to Afghan drug prob-
lems, there is a second, entirely distinct potential benefit. Inasmuch as counterinsurgency 
is ultimately a battle for public support, and since the Afghan people collectively suffer 
substantially from addiction, even the effort to provide drug treatment might earn good will. 
There are few treatment centers in Afghanistan, so it would be relatively cheap to achieve a 
large proportionate increase in treatment.77 Obviously, the absolute number of treatment 
slots matters if the objective is substantially reducing the burden of addiction, but percent-
age changes can also score public-relations points. The United States’ funding the majority 
of treatment slots in Afghanistan might reflect both its national concern about drug abuse 
and its compassion for the poor and vulnerable in Afghanistan. 
Besides trying to reduce drug use, there are also tactics for reducing the harm asso-
ciated with a given amount of drug use. Afghanistan is at risk of substantial spread of HIV 
due to injection drug use. HIV-prevention campaigns have had more impact on HIV/AIDS 
in some developing countries than drug-control interventions typically have on drug use. 
The usual recommendation would be needle-and-syringe programs (NSP). This may well be 
the most effective public-health intervention, but given the conservative culture in Afghani-
stan, it is unclear whether promoting NSP would be acceptable to the Afghan public; it 
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could backfire and trigger paranoia that the United States is in effect promoting drug addic-
tion among Afghans. It may also be difficult to explain within the United States. 
However, HIV control ought to be on the agenda of any narcotics policy for Afghani-
stan, and it may be that organizations and countries that have been successful in 
implementing NSP themselves are more natural leaders of any such efforts in Afghanistan. 
Conclusion 
Afghanistan is the poster child for fears of “narcoterrorism.” Accounts of the links be-
tween drug trafficking and terroristic violence are often exaggerated, but in Afghanistan 
those links are direct, clear, and of considerable importance. 
Hence it is natural to suppose that counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan contribute 
to the security-and-governance effort through their effects on drug markets. However, the 
opposite is more nearly true. Their natural tendency is to increase revenues from opiates 
trafficking, to channel more of those revenues to the most vicious armed groups, and to 
increase corruption. This is no less true of high-level enforcement, improved border secu-
rity, and rural development than it is of poppy-crop eradication. 
Afghanistan will remain the dominant, low-cost supplier of illicit opium for the Eura-
sian market for at least the medium term. Retail demand for Afghan opium and its 
products is inelastic with respect to Afghan export prices. So there is no reason to expect 
that changes—up or down—in the level of counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan would 
have a major impact for good or ill on the level of heroin abuse in the countries that import 
Afghan heroin. The impact on the U.S. market will in any case be close to nil. 
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Therefore, counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan mainly move production around 
geographically and socially, and change the distribution of revenues, rather than reducing 
production overall. 
It is possible that achieving better security and governance in Afghanistan, or the al-
lied goal of rural economic development, might in the long run reduce its production of 
opium and its exports of opiates; but policies aimed directly at reducing the size of the drug 
markets are unlikely to succeed either on their own terms or in terms of political and mili-
tary objectives via their effects on drug markets. 
Consequently, drug policies in Afghanistan should properly be chosen largely in con-
sideration of their potential direct contributions—again for good or ill—to security, 
governance, and economic development. In general, this will call for a lighter footprint, on 
the theory that “Less is more.” 
However, there is a case—not an airtight one—for keeping poppy-free regions poppy-
free. In theory there is an even stronger case for focusing enforcement on those forms of 
trafficking and those organizations most tightly linked to insurgency, warlordism, and cor-
ruption, but substantial doubt about whether that strategy could be implemented in 
practice. Diversifying Afghan drug-enforcement agencies so as to reduce opportunities for 
corruption may be a good idea, and equally likely to meet with strong internal and external 
resistance. 
The exception to the less-is-more principle is demand reduction. Such efforts may not 
have much impact on drug use, harm, or other objectives, but the sign of the impact is 
unambiguously favorable. Importers of heroin made from Afghan opium can help Afghani-
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stan by getting their consumers to consume less: retail enforcement, treatment, and man-
dated abstinence all have potential. 
Harm-control efforts seem to have very little impact on consumption, one way or the 
other. So it does not matter to Afghanistan what Russia does about HIV among its heroin 
users. But efforts to reduce the misery caused by opiates addiction in Afghanistan could 
reflect well on the Afghan government and its partners. 
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Table 1. Typical price of 1kg of heroin through the distribution system78 
Stage Price Location 
Farm gate1 $900 Afghanistan 
Processor $2500 Afghanistan 
Export $4,700 Afghanistan’s neighbors 
Import/ Wholesale (kg qty.) $17,000 Turkey 
Mid-level/ Wholesale (oz qty.) $66,000 England/Wales 
Retail (mg qty.) $239,000 UK 
1. Based on the amount of opium required to make 1 kg of heroin. 
 
 Figure 1. Opium cultivation/prices and security, by province79 
 
Source: Security—UN Department of Safety and Security (as of July 16, 2009) 
Source: Cultivation—Government of Afghanistan, national monitoring system implemented by UNODC, 2009 
Source: Prices—UNODC, December 2009 
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 Figure 2. Global opium production, 1995–200980 
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
1995 96 97 98 99 2000 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
to
n
n
es
Rest of Asia
W. Hemisphere
Burma
Afghanistan
 
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010. 
                                                 
1
 Statements that production has increased 40-fold since U.S.-led military occupation began are grossly misleading. Production in 
2001 was abnormally low, and trafficking in that year was largely buffered by inventories. Current cultivation is approximately double 
the average for years before the invasion. 
2
 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2010 (Vienna: UNODC, 2010), p. 20. 
3
 In Afghanistan, terms such as “insurgent” and “warlord” are of limited utility. We think of “insurgents” as armed political actors 
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political actors. 
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insurgents. While eliminating the opiates trade would not cripple the insurgents, it would weaken their revenue base and also improve 
security and governance by freeing up resources now used to combat it and by reducing opportunities for corruption. 
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in poppy cultivation will yield a reduction in available revenues, and in others an increase; it appears that the latter circumstances 
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10
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output. Richard A. Oppel, Jr., “Mysterious Blight Destroys Afghan Poppy Harvest,” New York Times, May 12, 2010, p. 1. 
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Alternative Livelihoods: Substance or Slogan? (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2005). However, we use 
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 Even countries better governed than Afghanistan that have reduced drug-crop cultivation, such as Thailand and Pakistan, have not 
necessarily improved their drug-trafficking problems, as they have moved up the value chain to become transit points for refined 
opiates. Moreover, it was precisely the increase in Afghan opium production that enabled shrinking production in those countries. 
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 Yaroslav Trofimov and Habib Zahori, “Police Official Goes on Trial in Kabul for Aiding Drug Trade,” Wall Street Journal, 
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51
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